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I realize that it is getting late. I promised Professor Stoltenberg
that since I would be the second-to-last speaker in the afternoon ses-
sion, I would try to keep things interesting.
I have a friend who is a customs lawyer. He had a client who was
engaged in importing a pharmaceutical from South America into the
United States. The pharmaceutical consisted of a white powder. The
powder was imported in metal drums, so that it could be made into
pills after importation.
Unfortunately, the white powder came from a South American
country that is in close geographical proximity to Colombia. So -
quite understandably - Customs agents frequently opened the drums
to poke around inside. Unfortunately, this meant the pharmaceutical
had to be sent back for reprocessing, which cost several thousand
dollars.
The lawyer tried to work out a solution with the regional Customs
office. He knew that Customs would continue to open the drums -
that is part of its job. But he wanted to develop a procedure so that his
client could be present to ensure that drums were opened *properly.
He was not successful: he visited the U.S. Customs Service headquar-
ters in Washington, D.C., but to no avail.
Finally, in desperation, the company came up with an unorthodox
solution. It stuck a label on the drums that said:
WARNING. CONTAINS AN ACTIVE BIOLOGICAL INGRE-
DIENT. EXCESSIVE EXPOSURE MAY LEAD TO ALTERA-
TION OF SEXUAL IDENTITY, PSYCHOTIC DELUSIONS,
AND BALDNESS.
(Please call before opening.)
I do not necessarily recommend this approach, but my friend claims
that it worked.
* Deputy Associate Director for International Economic Policy, Office of Policy Develop-
ment, The White House. The views contained in this article are those of the author and are not
necessarily those of the U.S. Government.
Unilateralism and 301
I am going to draw three lessons from this story and apply them to
section 301.
First, I will try to address the "what's inside the barrel" ques-
tion. Judging from this morning's session, there are some mis-
conceptions about section 301. Perhaps a brief description of the
law and its origins will help clear up the confusion.
Second, I will argue that with section 301, as with many other
things, appearances can be deceiving. Despite any appearance of
unilateralism, the United States has sought to use section 301 in a
constructive way, with the aim of strengthening the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and multilateral dis-
pute settlement mechanisms over the long term.
Third, we all know that it is important to read and understand
warning labels. Congress and the Executive Branch have recog-
nized that there are limits to section 301 and have worked within
these constraints.
II. SECTION 301
Despite extensive criticism, section 301 is a modest statute.' It di-
rects the United States Trade Representative (USTR), subject to the
direction of the President, to take action if (1) the rights of the United
States under a trade agreement are being denied, or (2) an act, policy,
or practice of a foreign government is "unjustifiable" and burdens or
restricts U.S. commerce. It also authorizes the USTR, again subject to
the direction of the President, to act if (3) an act, policy, or practice of
a foreign government is "unreasonable" and burdens or restricts U.S.
commerce.
"Action" generally consists of retaliation in the form of higher tar-
iffs on products of the foreign country engaging in unfair trade prac-
tices. These sanctions are imposed infrequently. Most section 301
cases are resolved through negotiation.
Section 301 began as section 252 of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962.2 To my knowledge, section 252 was never used. The statute
became "section 301" in the Trade Act of 1974. 3 In addition, it was
amended to authorize private parties to file petitions. In the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, Congress added time limits and tightened
section 301 procedure.4 This reflected concern that the Executive
1. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988).
2. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 252, 76 Stat. 872, 879-80 (1962).
3. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2364 (1975).
4. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, tit. IX, 93 Stat. 144, 295-300 (1979).
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Branch sometimes sat on section 301 investigations in order to avoid
unpleasant decisions. 5
Throughout this period, section 301 was a peripheral part of U.S.
trade law. The 1974 Act focused on amendments to the "escape
clause,"' 6 section 337,7 and the antidumping law.8 The 1979 Act fo-
cused on tightening antidumping and countervailing duty remedies
and procedures. 9 In both, section 301 was an afterthought.
Those days are over. Section 301 was the centerpiece of the Omni-
bus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (hereinafter "1988 Trade
Act" or "Act"):
1. The Act created a new procedure known as "Super 301". 1o For
two years - 1989 and 1990 - the USTR is required to identify for-
eign trade barriers and, based on the "number and pervasiveness" of
these barriers, to identify "priority foreign countries." The USTR
must initiate section 301 cases against "priority" unfair trade practices
in these countries.
2. The Act added another procedure known as "Special 301." 11
Each year, the USTR must identify countries that fail to provide ade-
quate and effective protection for intellectual property rights and initi-
ate section 301 cases.
3. The Act delegated the authority for imposing section 301 sanc-
tions to the USTR. Formerly, this authority was the President's. The
Act changed the decision-maker to the USTR, although it specified
that he or she acts "subject to the direction of the President."
4. The Act required that the USTR retaliate in certain cases in-
volving violations of trade agreement rights and "unjustifiable" prac-
tices.' 2 The Act, however, is not quite as mandatory as it might
appear, since it contains several narrow, carefully crafted exceptions.
1 3
5. The Act generally tightened section 301 procedures and im-
posed strict deadlines for decisions and actions.
5. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 239-42 (1979).
6. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1988).
7. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
8. The 1974 Act added the "constructed value" provisions of the antidumping law. 19
U.S.C. § 1677b (1988).
9. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673 (1988).
10. 19 U.S.C. § 2420 (1988).
11. 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (1988).
12. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (1988). An "unjustifiable" practice is defined at 19 U.S.C.
§ 241 l(d)(4)(A) as an "act, policy, or practice ... in violation of, or inconsistent with, the inter-
national legal rights of the United States."
13. See 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(a)( 2) (1988). In a frequently quoted (and accurate) observation, ex-
special Trade Representative Robert Strauss said in Congressional testimony that section 301
should be "mandatory, but not compulsory."
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III. U.S. TRADE POLICY
What happened to turn this "wimp" into the Arnold Schwarzeneg-
ger of U.S. trade law?
Those of you who have studied with Professor Jackson14 know
that U.S. trade law has both a legal and a political element. The
changes in section 301 are closely related to the shifting politics of
trade in the United States.
In 1980, when I first emerged from law school and got a job with
the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), international
trade was a backwater. Congress passed trade bills every once in a
while and GATT rounds occurred about once every ten years, but no
one paid much attention to either one.
The situation changed in the mid-1980's when the United States
started to run massive trade deficits. These deficits reshaped trade
politics to such an extent that the 1988 Trade Act was regarded as one
of the major achievements of the 100th Congress.
These tensions were mirrored in section 301. Through the mid-
1980's, section 301 was primarily of interest to trade specialists. It was
administered by a small, inter-agency "Section 301 Committee" and
relied almost entirely on the filing of petitions by private parties. The
U.S. Government's policy was to bring cases to GATT and to mini-
mize potential inconsistencies with GATT. While the Section 301
Committee was quite successful in resolving cases through negotia-
tions and GATT dispute settlement procedures, certain major section
301 cases that were taken to GATT were never resolved. As a result,
in some circles, section 301 acquired an unfair reputation for being all
talk and no action.
In this respect, 1985 was a watershed. The trade deficit was bal-
looning. Some critics claimed that the Administration did not have a
trade policy and was not doing enough to address the trade deficit.
The Administration had recently centralized international economic
decision-making in the Economic Policy Council (EPC) chaired by
then-Secretary of the Treasury, James A. Baker III. During August
and September, USTR and the EPC fashioned a section 301 initiative
that was announced on September 13. The Administration self-initi-
ated section 301 investigations of Japanese barriers to imported to-
bacco products, Korean restrictions on foreign insurance firms, and
Brazilian barriers to trade and foreign investment in the informatics
14. John H. Jackson, Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Professor Jackson is the
author of World Trade and the Law of GATT(1969) and a noted expert on GATT and U.S. trade
law.
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(computer and computer software) sector. 15 In addition, President
Reagan directed United States Trade Representative, Clayton Yeutter,
to expedite action in two existing section 301 cases, where GATT
panels had ruled in favor of the United States, but the foreign govern-
ments had failed to comply: Japanese leather quotas and European
Community (EC) canned fruit and raisins.
Congress followed up on these ideas in the 1988 Trade Act by di-
recting the USTR to continue to self-initiate section 301 cases and by
creating a formal process in Super 301 for identifying "priority" for-
eign countries and unfair trade practices.
IV. UNILATERALISM
As you may have gathered from the morning session, U.S. section
301 policy has generated intense foreign criticism. This criticism cen-
ters on its alleged "unilateralism."' 16 The argument goes something
like this: In the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
the United States and its trading partners have agreed on a common
set of rules to govern international trade and on a multilateral dispute
settlement mechanism for resolving disputes over the application and
interpretation of these rules. Yet, the United States now wishes to go
off on its own, taking on the role of "judge and jury" by attacking
foreign practices without reference to GATT rules or multilateral pro-
cedures. Indeed, there are no GATT rules governing many of the
practices about which the United States complains, 17 and in any case,
an increase in a GATT-bound tariff as a trade sanction is a violation of
GATT.
While everyone is entitled to an opinion, the foreign critique
should not be regarded as the end of the debate.
I will argue that the United States has used section 301 as a short-
term tool for pursuing long-term multilateral objectives. The long-
term goal of U.S. policy is the strengthening and expansion of the
GATT rules, backed up by strengthened international dispute settle-
ment and enforcement mechanisms.
In this sense, the 1988 Trade Act was not the loosing of a monster,
but a constructive development. The Act reflected a new consensus
15. 50 Fed. Reg. 37,608-09 (1985).
16. While section 301 has been called many things (some unfit for publication), it cannot be
termed "protectionist." If anything, section 301 is "too free trade" in its perspective, since it
seeks to force foreign governments to open their markets when they would prefer not to open
them.
17. A number of section 301 investigations have involved services, investment, and intellec-




between Congress and the Executive Branch about the direction of
U.S. trade policy. Despite intense frustration over the trade deficit,
Congress rejected protectionism as a policy option. Instead, the trade
bill centered on (1) aggressive efforts to open foreign markets under
section 301, and (2) intensified Uruguay Round negotiations to
strengthen and expand GATT. This point was brought home most
clearly when the Senate dropped the so-called Gephardt amendment,
which relied on across-the-board import surcharges to reduce bilateral
trade imbalances, and substituted Super 301, which centers on opening
foreign markets to U.S. exports.
There can be no question that the ideal international trading envi-
ronment is one in which there are strong, clear, and comprehensive
multilateral disciplines, coupled with effective enforcement mecha-
nisms. By limiting government interference in economic activity,
strong GATT rules allow private traders to seek out new markets and
new economic efficiencies. Effective dispute settlement and enforce-
ment mechanisms are necessary to protect against interference by gov-
ernments, who are always under political pressure to tilt the proverbial
playing field. Such a system would promote the free flow of goods,
services, and investment between nations and increase global stan-
dards of living.
There also can be no question that such a system does not exist
today. While GATT was an incredible achievement in 1947, its weak-
nesses have become apparent:
-GATT is limited to traditional trade in goods and does not
cover important areas of world economic activity, such as invest-
ment, services, and intellectual property rights ("IPR").
-Certain GATT rules, which were originally created as prag-
matic political compromises, are now meaningless. While it is
unusual for a government to disregard a clear and unambiguous
international obligation, it is an invitation to trouble when the
rules are vague or shot full of exceptions. Such ambiguities invite
government meddling, particularly when political gains are to be
had. The agricultural subsidy rules, which have encouraged mas-
sive government interventions in the agricultural sector, are one
example.
-The GATT has permitted self-centered "beggar-thy-neigh-
bor" policies by less-developed countries (LDCs) that would be
intolerable in a developed country. While it is arguably possible
to accept such deviations when a country is truly less developed,
these policies have become difficult to ignore as more and more
"newly industrialized countries" (NICs) cross the threshold of in-
Winter 19901
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dustrialization to become significant players in the international
trading system.
-Finally, the GATT dispute settlement mechanism cannot
guarantee compliance with the rules.' 8 In particular, because
GATT. requires a consensus of all contracting parties before a
panel report is adopted, it is possible for the losing party to block
a report indefinitely.
The logical solution would be to reform the international trading
system in the Uruguay Round.
The challenge, however, is how to get from A to Z. While the
system clearly could use updating, some foreign participants, particu-
larly those with extensive trade barriers, are perfectly comfortable
with the status quo. A government that does not protect intellectual
property rights, for example, has little incentive to change if it can
pirate foreign goods and inventions for free. And a government that
extensively subsidizes domestic agriculture and disposes of excess pro-
duction by dumping it into world markets has every reason to con-
tinue doing so, particularly if any change in the system would be
opposed by farmers who have profited from it. Such measures are
equally a form of unilateralism: they involve the pursuit of selfish in-
terests at the expense of the international trading system as a whole.
What is needed is an outside disruptive force to create pressures
for change. Super, Special, and section 301 represent an effort to sup-
ply this incentive and concentrate attention on the need for GATT
reform. In a sense, the United States has signalled that foreign barri-
ers to U.S. trade, services, investment, and IPR are important. These
barriers can be discussed in the Uruguay Round negotiations in
GATT or they can be addressed under section 301 and its progeny.
But they will be dealt with in some fashion.
V. A NEGOTIATING TOOL
While section 301 provides important leverage for the United
States, it also has certain limits that ought to be appreciated.
First, section 301 will not fix the trade deficit. The trade deficit
arises from broader macroeconomic factors that have a very limited
relationship to U.S. trade policy or unfair trade practices.19
18. GATT Article XXIII permits a contracting party to challenge actions by another con-
tracting party that are inconsistent with GATT or "nullify or impair" a tariff concession. See J.
JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GAT 178-87 (1969). These issues are heard by
panels of impartial experts. The panel issues a report containing its findings and recommenda-
tions. In the 1950s, this procedure was a legal innovation that permitted the interpretation,
clarification and, on occasion, the creative expansion of GATT discipline.
19. In 1986, the General Accounting Office (GAO) commissioned a blue ribbon panel to
[Vol. 11:394
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Second, it is difficult to build an effective global trade policy exclu-
sively around section 301. Because section 301 typically relies on ne-
gotiations with a single foreign government to address a single unfair
trade practice, it is a very labor-intensive way to seek change. While
GATT negotiations are time-consuming and sometimes incremental,
they can lead to broad-based multilateral reforms that are adopted by
a large number of governments.
Third, section 301 requires leverage with a particular foreign gov-
ernment. If leverage exists, section 301 negotiations can be quite effec-
tive. If not, the goal of opening up foreign markets and increasing
U.S. exports is exceedingly difficult to achieve.
Fourth, like any power-oriented system, section 301 can generate a
high degree of unpredictability, particularly if the cases frequently lead
to U.S. retaliation and foreign counter-retaliation. American business-
men, like businessmen everywhere, often seek a predictable interna-
tional trading environment. When the United States imposes
sanctions on foreign goods, foreign governments have not infrequently
struck back by imposing reciprocal sanctions on American goods or
investments. In such trade wars, the U.S. exporter, the U.S. con-
sumer, and the foreign exporter are all worse off, at least in the short
term.
Fifth, trade sanctions can have spillover effects on other U.S.
objectives20 and, if abused, a corrosive effect on the international trad-
ing system itself.
In sum, it is useful to appreciate that section 301 is a tool, not the
magic fix for every trade problem. By challenging unfair trade barri-
ers, section 301 protects the integrity of the international trading sys-
tem, which is essential from a perceived equity standpoint. It is a
wedge for opening foreign markets to U.S. exports and, if negotiations
fail, for defending U.S. economic interests. But it is not cost-free, nor
is it necessarily the ultimate solution to the underlying problems of the
global trading system.
study the U.S. trade deficits. Its conclusions were reported in, The U.S. Trade Deficit.- Causes
and Policy Options for Solutions, GAO/NSIAD 87-135 (1987). The GAO's conclusions included
the following:
"Although these two factors [foreign trade barriers and loss of U.S. competitiveness]
clearly have an effect on trade, they do not account for the sharp rise in the trade deficit
since 1980 because they have changed little in recent years." Id. at 2.
"The U.S. trade balance is fundamentally determined by U.S. fiscal and monetary poli-
cies and those of its trading partners." Id.
"Changing the current mix of U.S. macroeconomic policies is essential to lowering the
U.S. trade deficit." Id. at 3.
20. While in the past trade has perhaps been unnecessarily subordinated to U.S. foreign pol-
icy and international financial or national security objectives, neither of these considerations can
be entirely ignored. The issue is one of balance.
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VI. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1988 TRADE ACT
The Administration and the Congress have worked together to im-
plement the Super and section 301 provisions prudently in order to
further the long-term market-opening goals of U.S. trade policy.
In identifying the Administration's "priority" unfair trade prac-
tices under Super 301, President Bush made clear that the U.S. prefer-
ence is a stronger GATT system:
The Uruguay Round of the GATT continues to be the centerpiece of our
trade strategy. While the lack of effective multilateral rules and enforce-
ment mechanisms has forced us to resort to section 301, we look forward
to the day when such actions will be unnecessary.
21
In addition, where possible, the United States has pursued unfair
trade issues in GATT. The successful resolution this year of U.S.
complaints regarding Korean beef quotas, EC oilseeds subsidies, and
EC export restrictions on copper scrap shows that, in some circum-
stances, the GATT can be a very effective instrument for challenging
unfair trade practices.
VII. CONCLUSION
In short, there is a clearly understood creative tension between sec-
tion 301 and the GATT. One hopes that this tension will lead to a
stronger multilateral trading system. In any case, those who object to
section 301 and the alleged unilateralism of U.S. trade policy know
where the ultimate solutions to these issues lie.
21. Statement by the President, Office of the White House Press Secretary, Release Announc-
ing Super 301 (May 26, 1989).
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